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INFORMED CONSENT, PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATIONS,
AND A PRESCRIBING PHYSICIAN'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE
SAFER ALTERNATIVE TREATMENTS
Rita Barnett-Rose*
I. INTRODUCTION
The parents of 8-year-old Sophie, a young girl who seems to be
both inattentive and hyperactive at school, take their daughter
to a pediatrician after Sophie 's third-grade teacher suggests
that Sophie may have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
("ADHD"), the most commonly diagnosed mental health disor-
der of childhood. During the initial visit, Sophie 's parents ask
the pediatrician about possible food-based causes of Sophie's
problematic behaviors, based on certain observations of Sophie
at home. The pediatrician, however, informs the parents that the
evidence does not support any diet-based connection to ADHD.
Instead, after a 15-minute consultation, the pediatrician recom-
mends that Sophie be put on methylphenidate, a Schedule II
Controlled Narcotic, to control the identified behavioral symp-
toms. The pediatrician does not discuss any alternative treat-
ment options.
Trusting in their pediatrician and thus believing there are no
viable alternative treatments to psychotropic medication,
Sophie 's parents put their daughter on the methylphenidate, but
soon grow concerned over a number of disturbing side-effects.
Later, while attending a parent support group for children with
ADHD, Sophie's parents discover that there are, in fact, a
number of recent scientific studies positively linking the
behaviors associated with ADHD to diet. This new information
corroborates their own observations of their daughter's
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behavior at home. Sophie's parents elect to discontinue giving
Sophie the methylphenidate and begin a carefully restricted diet
instead. Within two months, Sophie's ADHD symptoms have
completely disappeared. Sophie's parents are now
understandably upset that their pediatrician, whom they believe
had -- or should have had -- information regarding the most
recent scientific studies linking diet and ADHD, did not disclose
this material information to them before recommending
psychotropic medication for their child The parents insist that
had they known about the evidence linking diet to ADHD, they
would not have chosen methylphenidate first - and were
accordingly deprived of giving true informed consent to the
recommended treatment of psychotropic medication. The
pediatrician insists that he did not have any duty to disclose
such information, both because he did not personally believe in
the effectiveness of any diet-based alternative treatment options,
and because, regardless of the recent studies to the contrary, the
mainstream medical community to which he belongs has not
recognized any diet-based alternative treatments to
psychotropic medication.
The use of psychotropic medication to treat any presumed mental
health disorder always involves serious risks of harm.' Accordingly,
before prescribing psychotropic medication to control the behaviors
associated with a presumed mental health disorder, under various medical
ethical guidelines and informed consent laws, prescribing physicians must
first disclose available information regarding not only the risks of taking
the recommended medication, but also the availability of alternative
treatment options, and the risks and benefits of choosing such alternative
treatment options.2 Indeed, given the highly intrusive nature of
psychotropic medication and the concededly unknown etiology of most
mental health disorders, disclosing information in support of safer
alternative treatments seems a particularly critical aspect of a prescribing
physician's informed consent obligations in the mental health arena.
3
Unfortunately, in practice, studies suggest that prescribing physicians
rarely disclose any safer alternative treatment options to psychotropic
1 See Myers v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 138 P.3d 238, 241 (Alaska 2006) ("Psychotropic drugs affect the
mind, behavior, intellectual functions, perception, moods, and emotions and are known to cause a number
of potentially devastating side effects."); see generally GRACE E. JACKSON, RETHINKING PSYCHIATRIC
DRUGS: A GUIDE FOR INFORMED CONSENT (2005) (discussing numerous dangers of psychotropic
medications).
2 See discussion infra Sec. II.
3 See discussion infra Sec. II and III.
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medication, even where there is persuasive evidence that such safer
alternatives exist.4 To use an example: with respect to treating Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), the most commonly diagnosed
childhood mental health disorder in the United States, a number of recent
randomized controlled trials (RCT's) have indicated that a sizable majority
of children diagnosed with ADHD are actually suffering from allergies to
certain additives and preservatives in food.5 Indeed, one RCT conducted in
2011 by the ADHD Institute of the Netherlands and published in The
Lancet indicated that once the identified irritants were removed from the
children's diets, the behavioral symptoms associated with ADHD were
completely eliminated in 64% of the children. 6 Nevertheless, despite these
encouraging findings, and consequent calls to incorporate safer first-line
diet-based treatment interventions to the standard ADHD protocol outside
of the United States, evidence suggests that the relevant prescribing
physician communities within the United States have largely ignored these
RCT's, and continue to recommend psychotropic medication, typically
stimulants, as the first, and often only, treatment option for this purported
disorder.7 Given that this information regarding a diet-based approach
would undoubtedly be material to an ADHD patient or his or her legal
surrogate, it can hardly be said that patients deprived of this information
are giving true informed consent to treatment with psychotropic
medication.
Yet, as this article describes, informed consent law in this country
provides very little incentive for prescribing physicians to disclose
information regarding alternative treatment options that might lie outside
of their particular medical community's recognized forms of treatment,
4 See discussion infra Sec. III.
5 See discussion infra Sec. III; see also Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Increasing Prevalence
of Parent Reported Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Among Children - United States 2003 and
2007, 59 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 1439-43 (Nov. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5944a3.htm?scid=mm5944a3_w [hereinafter CDC]
("ADHD is the most commonly diagnosed neurobiological disorder of childhood, with previous reports
documenting increasing trends in prevalence during the past decade and increases in ADHD medication
use."); see also JACKSON, supra note 1, at 17 (A "randomized controlled trial" is defined as "a prospective
scientific experiment comparing the value of a treatment strategy in an experimental group with an
alternative strategy in a control group, in which allocation to experimental or control group is determined
by chance." Such RCT's are considered the "gold standard" for both scientific research and evidence-based
medicine).
6 Liddy M. Pelsser et al., Effects of a Restricted Elimination Diet on the Behaviour of Children with
Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (INCA Study): A Randomised Controlled Trial, 377 THE LANCET
494, 500 (Feb. 5, 2011).
7 See discussion infra Sec. III; see also JACKSON, supra note 1, at 263-64 (Some typical stimulant
mediations used to "treat" ADHD are d-amphetamine (Dexedrine), methylphenidate (Ritalin, Concerta),
pemoline (Cylert) and amphetamine and dextroamphetamine combos (Adderall). Atomoxetine (Strattera),
allegedly a non-stimulant, is also prescribed for ADHD.).
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and very little legal recourse for patients or their legal surrogates who are
deprived of such material information. Instead, in roughly half of U.S.
jurisdictions, mainstream physician communities are specifically allowed
by law to set their own disclosure standards, and have not surprisingly
limited disclosure of alternatives to their own recognized courses of
treatment, rendering informed consent meaningless in such "medical
community" standard jurisdictions.8 As for the other half, because courts
even in the purportedly more patient-centered "reasonable patient"
jurisdictions have thus far refused to require physicians to disclose
available alternative treatments outside of the mainstream's recognized
treatments, treatment decisions even in those jurisdictions also amount to
no more than what the doctor ordered.9
While failing to require physicians to disclose material information
regarding available but unrecognized alternative treatments has potentially
devastating consequences for patients in all areas of medical practice, this
article argues that such paternalistic deference is particularly unwarranted
in the context of experimental treatment with high-risk psychotropic
medication. Indeed, as this article further suggests, negligence-based
informed consent laws are simply unsuitable to protect mental health
patients in this experimental but high-risk context, and should be replaced
entirely by statutory-based dignitary models.10
Part II of this article describes the basic ethical and legal obligations
acknowledged by or imposed upon physicians with respect to the
disclosure of alternative treatment options, both in general and in the
context of prescribing psychotropic medication. Part III then discusses the
available scientific literature establishing an alternative treatment option to
stimulant medication for the treatment of ADHD, and argues that the
relevant prescribing physician communities have collectively failed to
disclose such alternative treatment information to their ADHD patients,
apparently without consequence. Part IV of this article explores case law
that suggests that court-based deference to mainstream physicians
regarding disclosure of available but unrecognized alternative treatments
continues to deprive patients of material information, regardless of the
disclosure standard purportedly adopted by the particular jurisdiction. Part
IV also discusses why such court-based deference is particularly
unwarranted in the context of experimental treatments with psychotropic
8 See discussion infra Sec. II & Sec. IV.
9 See discussion infra Sec. II & Sec. IV.
10 See discussion infra Sec. IV-C (A dignitary-based model would provide protection for a patient's bodily
dignity and allow patients to sue for violations of informed consent that do not result in any injury other
than the denial of the information itself.).
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medication. Part V concludes that general negligence-based informed
consent laws meant for traditional medical practice fail to ensure
disclosure of alternative treatments to psychotropic medication, and
recommends that legislatures adopt dignitary-based informed consent
provisions that will better ensure both adequate physician disclosure of
alternative treatments to psychotropic medication, and provide an actual
remedy for patients in the event of a physician's breach.
II. INFORMED CONSENT AND THE DUTY TO DISCLOSE
ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT OPTIONS TO RECOMMENDED
TREATMENTS
The doctrine of informed consent evolved in response to a number of
breaches by health care practitioners in treating patients beyond the
consented for treatment." First articulated by the court in Schloendorffv.
Society of New York Hospital, where Justice Cardozo famously declared
that "every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body," the doctrine first
emerged as a cause of action in battery and was limited solely to actions
for treatment for which the patient had not consented. 12 Gradually, the
courts recognized a cause of action for situations where the patient
consented to the particular treatment, but was not provided with adequate
information regarding the recommended treatment, including risks,
benefits, and any available alternative treatment options to such
recommended treatment. 3 The doctrine of informed consent today is both
an ethical mandate under relevant medical ethical guidelines, and a legal
duty imposed either by common law or as codified by legislation.
In general, the term "informed consent" encompasses five primary
elements: voluntarism, capacity, disclosure, understanding, and decision) 4
"Voluntarism" requires that the patient be free from coercion or unfair
persuasions and inducements in making a treatment decision. "Capacity"
II See Erin Talati, When a Spoonful of Sugar Doesn't Help the Medicine Go Down: Informed Consent,
Mental Illness, and Moral Agency, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 171, 174 (2009).
12 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). Where a child is involved, the right to give informed consent to the child's
treatment falls to the parent or other legal guardian. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972)
("[l]f the patient is a minor or incompetent, the authority to consent is transferred to the patient's legal
guardian or closest available relative."); see also Dana E. Prescott, Cosas & Psychopharmacological
Interventions: Informed Consent and a Child's Right to Self-Determination, 11 J. L & FAM. STUD. 97, 97
(2008).
13 See Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 10; see also Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor
Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 319-25 (2002).
14 See Marcela G. del Carmen & Steven Joffe, Informed Consent for Medical Treatment and Research: A
Review, 10 THE ONCOLOGIST 636, 637 (2005), available at http://theoncologist.alphamedpress.org/content/
10/8/636).
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refers to the patient's mental ability to make health care decisions.
"Disclosure" requires that a physician provide all material information
needed by the patient to make a treatment decision, while "Understanding"
requires that the patient comprehend the information and appreciate its
relevance to his or her individual situation. Finally, "Decision" refers to a
patient's ultimate authorization allowing the physician to execute the
proposed treatment. 5 Although all elements are necessary to determine
whether "informed consent" was truly given to any particular course of
treatment, this article is concerned primarily with the element of disclosure
- a physician's obligation to provide his or her patient with the material
information needed in order to make a particular treatment decision.
Implicit in such a disclosure obligation is the obligation to provide patients
with all information that would be material to a patient's decision -
including any available treatment alternatives to the physician's
recommended course of treatment.
A. Medical Ethical Disclosure Obligations and Alternative
Treatment Options
Before considering what current disclosure obligations are legally
imposed upon physicians, it is helpful to consider the obligations the
mainstream medical community has chosen to ethically impose upon
itself. Today all relevant medical communities acknowledge a physician's
ethical obligation to provide information to his or her patient that would be
material to his or her treatment decision. In its Code of Medical Ethics, the
American Medical Association (AMA) states that:
The patient's right of self-decision can be effectively exercised
only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an
informed choice. The patient should make his or her own
determination about treatment. The physician's obligation is to
present the medical facts accurately to the patient or to the
individual responsible for the patient's care and to make
recommendations for management in accordance with good
medical practice. The physician has an ethical obligation to help
the patient make choices from among the therapeutic
alternatives consistent with good medical practice. Informed
consent is a basic policy in both ethics and law that physicians
must honor, unless the patient is unconscious or otherwise
incapable of consenting and harm from failure to treat is
15 Id.
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imminent. 16
In order to allow patients to exercise this right of self-determination,
the AMA specifically advises its physicians to disclose to the patient or the
patient's legal surrogate:
(1) the patient's diagnosis, if known;
(2) the nature and purpose of a proposed treatment or procedure;
(3) alternatives (regardless of their cost or the extent to which
the treatment options are covered by health insurance);
(4) the risks and benefits of the alternative treatment or proce-
dure; and
(5) the risks and benefits of not receiving or undergoing a treat-
ment or procedure.
17
The AMA further notes that withholding this type of material medical
information from patients without their knowledge or consent would be
"ethically unacceptable."'"
While the AMA Guidelines were likely intended to broaden the
historically limited scope of physician disclosure, it appears that disclosure
of alternative treatment options is limited to those that are "consistent with
good medical practice."' 9 Such a qualifier begs the question of whether the
AMA would consider it ethically necessary to disclose available
alternative treatments beyond those that would need to be considered
under the particular physician's ordinary standard of care obligations.2°
16 AMA Code of Medical Ethics: Opinion E-808 - Informed Consent, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
http://www.ama-assn.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion808.page (last updated Nov. 2006).
17 AMA supra note 16; see also 11-140.989 Informed Consent and Decision-Making in Health Care,
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/PolicyFinder/policyfiles/
HnE/H-140.989.HTM (last accessed March 16, 2014).
18 AMA Ethical Guidelines: E-8.082-Withholding Information from Patients, AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION, http://www.ama-assn.org//ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics
/opinion8082.page (last accessed June 10, 2013).
19 See AMA, supra note 16; see also Morris, supra note 13, at 313 (discussing the historical reluctance of
physicians to disclose any information to their patients, and noting that physicians only recently began to
acknowledge that "patients today no longer accept their place as obedient children, powerless even to
question the decisions of their physician-fathers").
20 See James A. Bulen, Complementary and Alternative Medicine: Ethical and Legal Aspects of Informed
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Perhaps in response to such an ambiguity, a number of physicians
have individually begun to recognize an ethical obligation to disclose
alternative treatment options that might exist outside of their own
conventional treatments where reliable evidence warrants. According to
one practitioner:
A physician's duty of care does not necessarily include the
obligation to provide information about therapies outside the
range of conventional treatment or those not yet supported in the
medical literature. However as [complementary and alternative]
therapies such as acupuncture become better studied and their
safety and efficacy are established, the scope of disclosure
required may expand to include them. The legal and ethical
obligation to obtain informed consent to treatment requires
disclosure and discussion of therapies when there is reliable
evidence of potential therapeutic benefit.2
Despite individual acknowledgement, however, the AMA's current
ethical disclosure guidelines remain unclear as to what extent it believes
physicians have an ethical obligation to consider "reliable evidence"
regarding alternatives to recommended treatments that reside outside of a
physician's traditional medical practice - or to disclose such material
information to their patients.
B. Legal Informed Consent and the Disclosure of Alternative
Treatment Options
Beyond ethical guidelines, the law also purportedly imposes upon
physicians a duty to inform patients of the material risks, benefits, and
alternative treatment options to any recommended course of treatment.22
This duty of disclosure is presented as a separate and distinct obligation
from a physician's legal duty to use due care. 2' Thus, even if a physician
Consent to Treatment, 24 J. LEGAL. MED. 331, 332 n. 4 (2003) (standard of care is defined as the course of
treatment generally accepted within the conventional medical community as medically reasonable for a
given illness). The duty to use "due care" generally means a physician's responsibility to treat a patient as a
reasonably competent physician in the same or similar medical specialty would. Duty of care is the first
element that must be established to proceed with an action in medical negligence. See, e.g., Smith v. United
States, 119 F. Supp. 2d 561, 573 (D.S.C. 2000).
21 Joan Gilmour et al., Informed Consent: Advising Patients and Parents about Complementary and
Alternative Medicine Therapies, 128 PEDIATRICS S187 (2011), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/ 28/Supplement_4/S 149. full.
22 See, e.g., Flanagan v. Wesselhoeft, 712 A.2d 365, 371 (R.I. 1998) ("[I]nformed consent is not possible
when a physician has failed to address both the material risks associated with and the viable alternatives to
a recommended surgical procedure.").
23 Flanagan, 712 A.2d at 370 ("This theory, which today is known as the doctrine of informed consent,
[VOL. 16.1:67
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complies with his standard of care obligations by treating the patient as a
reasonable physician would under similar circumstances, a physician could
presumably still be liable for failing to discuss with the patient any and all
available alternative treatment options to the choice of care selected by the
physician.24
Yet, the actual parameters of required disclosure are not uniform
throughout the United States. Instead, physicians are governed by one of
two disclosure standards: (1) the medical community standard, and (2) the
reasonable patient standard.25
1. Medical Community Standard
The medical community standard, although no longer the majority
standard in the United States, nevertheless still governs in a sizable
number of United States jurisdictions.26 Under this medical community
standard, physicians are required to disclose to patients only those risks,
benefits, and alternative treatment options to a recommended course of
treatment that a reasonable physician with similar training and experience
would consider material to a treatment decision.27 Because this standard
simply follows a physician's standard of care obligations, it is hard to see
any real distinction between a claim for a failure to use due care and a
failure to obtain informed consent in such a jurisdiction. Under this
standard, the physician is only required to inform the patient about
treatments generally recognized by similar physicians in the same or
similar area of practice. Thus, as long as the physician discloses what is
generally recognized within his or her own medical community as an
available treatment option, there would presumably be no viable claim
against that physician for a failure to inform the patient of other available
but unrecognized alternative treatments, regardless of the amount of
evidence supporting such an alternative treatment, and regardless of
imposes a duty upon a doctor which is completely separate and distinct from his responsibility to skillfully
diagnose and treat the patient's ills.").
24 See, e.g., Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 463 (N.J. 1999) ("Because the patient has a right to
be fully informed about medically reasonable courses of treatment, we are unpersuaded that a cause of
action predicated on the physician's breach of a standard of care adequately protects the patient's right to be
informed of treatment alternatives.").
25 See Bulen, supra note 20, at 335-40.
26 Talati, supra note 11, at 178-80.
27 See, e.g., Foster v. Oral Surgery Ass'n, 940 A.2d 1102, 1106 (Me. 2008) ("[T]he scope of a physician's
duty to disclose is measured by those communications a reasonable medical practitioner in that branch of
medicine would make under the same or similar circumstances."); see also, e.g., Eady v. Lansford, 92
S.W.3d 57, 60 (Ark. 2002) ("[T]he duty of a physician to disclose is measured by the customary disclosure
practices of physicians in the community or a similar community."). The medical community standard is
also sometimes referred to as the physician-oriented standard or the medical custom standard.
2014]
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whether the patient himself would have found the available alternative
treatment information material to his or her own treatment decision.
Indeed, the medical community standard erroneously assumes that how
much information should be disclosed to a patient is a judgment requiring
medical expertise. 8 Accordingly, although disclosure and competent
practice are purportedly different legal obligations, by tying the disclosure
obligation to the physician's medical community's customs, "informed
consent" in a medical community jurisdiction is, in reality, nothing more
than a patient agreeing to what the doctor ordered.
2. Reasonable Patient Standard
Recognizing that "unlimited discretion in the physician is
irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to make the ultimate
decision regarding the course of treatment to which he knowledgeably
consents to be subjected," both the California Supreme Court in Cobbs v.
Grant and the United States District Court for the D.C. Circuit in
Canterbury v. Spence, began the shift from the medical community-
created standard to the judicially-imposed, reasonable patient standard.29
Under the reasonable patient standard, a physician is required to disclose
all information regarding the risks, benefits, and alternative treatment
options that a reasonable patient in the patient's shoes would find material
to a treatment decision.3 ° The standard is purportedly set by "law" and not
by the medical community of which a defendant physician is a part, and
presumably expands beyond a physician's duty to exercise due care.31
Unfortunately, the reasonable patient standard is still not concerned
with what a particular patient would want to know before making a
-treatment decision. Instead, both the Cobb and the Canterbury courts
28 See Bulen, supra note 20, at 336 (noting that requiring patients to find medical experts to testify as to
what should have been disclosed per medical community standards is a significant burden for patients who
might face a "conspiracy of silence" in the relevant medical community).
29 Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 1, 10; Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see also Talati,
supra note 11, at 178 (the reasonable patient standard now is in the slight majority within the United
States).
30 See, e.g., Levesque v. Bristol Hosp., 943 A.2d 430, 443 (Conn. 2008) ("[A] physician is obligated to
provide the patient with that information which a reasonable patient would have found material for making
a decision..."); see also, e.g., Miller-McGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 440 (D.C. 2006) ("The test
for mandatory disclosure of information on treatment of the patient's condition is whether a reasonable
person in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient's position would consider the
information material to his decision.").
31 See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784 ("Respect for the patient's right of self-determination on a particular
therapy demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may or may not
impose upon themselves."); see also Bulen, supra note 20, at 341 (noting that the reasonable patient
standard must be understood to be broader than the physician's standard of care if it is to have any
meaning. Otherwise, the patient-oriented standard would simply "collapse" into the physician-oriented
standard).
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limited required disclosure to what a "reasonable person" would likely
consider material to a treatment decision under the same or similar
circumstances.32 Still, courts operating in a reasonable patient jurisdiction
would presumably find a breach of a physician's disclosure obligations if a
physician failed to disclose alternative treatment information that a
reasonable patient would find material, even if the alternative treatment
was not recognized or recommended by the particular physician or his or
her medical community.
33
The reasonable patient standard is now the majority disclosure
standard in the United States, and is seemingly more protective of patients'
self-determination rights than the medical community standard.34
However, as case law below will illustrate, courts in reasonable patient
jurisdictions are often indistinguishable from medical community
jurisdictions, and often simply defer to the challenged physician or
medical community itself to determine which alternatives are "reasonable"
or "available" to the patient, regardless of the patient's own interests. This
in turn severely limits disclosure of alternative treatment options outside of
the mainstream's preferred treatments.35
C. Informed Consent and Disclosure of Alternatives in the Mental
Health Context
In the mental health context, informed consent is often complicated
by additional questions regarding a mental health patient's competency to
36consent. As a result, specific statutory informed consent rules may
govern the involuntary treatment of mental health patients, as well as the
treatment of certain vulnerable populations deemed legally incapable of
giving consent.37 Outside of these involuntary or potentially coercive
32 Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11-12; Canterbury, 464 F2d at 791.
33 See, e.g., Matthies, 733 A. 2d at 462 (N.J. 1999) ("[P]hysicians do not adequately discharge their
responsibility by disclosing only treatment alternatives that they recommend."); see also, e.g., Saks v. Ng,
890 A.2d 983, 992 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) ("[F]or a patient's consent to be informed, the
physician must discuss with the patient medically reasonable alternatives that the physician does not
recommend."). Indeed, the court in Canterbury stated that it was incumbent upon the physician himself to
be familiar with the availability of alternative treatments, so that the patient could weigh and consider all of
the available options. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 781, stating:
To the physician, whose training enables a self-satisfying evaluation, the answer may seem
clear, but it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the
direction in which his interests seem to lie. To enable the patient to chart his course
understandably, some familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their hazards becomes
essential.
34 See Talati, supra note 11, at 178.
35 See discussion infra Sec. IV-A(2).
36 See generally Talati, supra note 11, at 181-86.
37 See, e.g., Myers, 138 P.3d at 242 (discussing Alaska's informed consent statute for the involuntary
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contexts, however, informed consent for voluntary, outpatient treatment
for presumed mental health disorders in the United States is largely
governed by each state's general informed consent laws.38
Physicians engaged in treating presumed mental health disorders,
including members of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatrists (AACAP) and the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP),
similar to the AMA, also profess their ethical disclosure obligations to
their mental health patients. 39 Thus, the various ethical guidelines for these
prescribing physician communities also acknowledge that informed
consent disclosure generally requires disclosure of: (1) the nature of the
ailment or condition; (2) the nature of the proposed diagnostic steps and/or
course of treatment(s), and the probability of their success; (3) the
existence and nature of the risks involved in the recommended treatment;
and (4) the existence, potential benefits, and risks of recommended
alternative treatments, including the choice of no treatment.4 °
Similar to the AMA Guidelines, however, the AAP's ethical
guidelines also seem to limit the disclosure of alternative treatments to
"recommended" alternative treatments. This leaves it unclear as to whether
the AAP believes that a physician treating a mental health patient has an
ethical obligation to disclose alternative treatment options that may lie
beyond the physician's preference or medical bailiwick. However, at least
administration of psychotropic medications to patients). Other involuntary contexts where treatment with
psychotropic medication may be involved include children in the foster care system or prison populations.
This article does not address informed consent disclosure issues in the involuntary or coercive contexts. For
interesting reading on some of these contexts: see Matthew M. Cummings, Sedating Forgotten Children:
How Unnecessary Psychotropic Medication Endangers Foster Children's Rights and Health, 32 B.C. J.L.
& SOC. JUST. 357 (2012); Yee also Dana E. Prescott, Cosas and Psychopharmacological Interventions:
Informed Consent and a Child's Right to Self-Determination, II J. L. & FAM. STUD. 97 (2008).
38 A few states have enacted informed consent provisions with respect to the administration of
psychotropic medications for children in particular. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 25-1-9-6.8 (2013)
(requiring practitioners to follow the most recent AAP or AACAP guidelines for diagnosing and evaluating
a child before prescribing psychotropic medications).
39 See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics' Committee on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental
Permission, and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 315 (1995), available at
http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/95/2/314.full.pdf [hereinafter AAP COMMITTEE]; see also
Know Your Rights: Consent and Confidentiality, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry,
available at http://www.aacap.org/cs/root/facts for families/know_yourrightsconsent and_
confidentiality (last updated June 2012) [hereinafter AACAP CONSENT]; see also Cynthia Geppert,
Obtaining Informed Consent in Psychiatric Practice: Guidelines and Strategies, PSYCHIATRY WEEKLY
(Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.psychweekly.com/aspx/article/articlepf.aspx?articleid=583.
Pediatricians are often involved in the prescribing of stimulant medications and anti-depressants for
children. See, e.g., Laurel K. Leslie et. al., Implementing the American Academy of Pediatrics Attention-
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder Diagnostic Guidelines in Primary Care Settings, 114 PEDIATRICS 129, 130
(2004); see also, e.g., Eugenia Chan et al., Diagnostic Practices for Attention Deficient Hyperactivity
Disorder: A National Survey of Primary Care Physicians, 5 AMBULATORY PEDIATRICS 201, 201 (July-
Aug. 2005).
40 See AAP COMMITTEE, supra; see also, AACAP CONSENT, supra.
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some mental health practitioners have acknowledged this ethical
obligation:
The ethical practitioner needs to keep up-to-date with empirical
findings on all somatic and psychosocial treatments, including
their indications, adverse effects, and contraindications.
Moreover, clinicians who prescribe medications should be
prepared to recommend relevant data-driven psychotherapies
and psychosocial interventions that may be indicated as a first-
line treatment or as important adjunctive treatments - even if
these must be provided by another practitioner.41
Today, the most pervasive form of treatment in the mental health
context involves the use of psychotropic medication to control the
behaviors typically associated with the presumed mental health
disorder.42 In a nutshell, psychotropic medications are "toxic substances
that act directly on the brain to chemically alter mood, cognition, or
behavior, their effect being achieved by altering the processes of brain
neurotransmission. ' 43 Typically psychotropic medications are classified
into four sub-types: (1) stimulant medications (used to treat ADHD, such
as Ritalin and Adderall), (2) anti-depressant and anti-anxiety medications
(used to treat depression, OCD, and related disorders, such as Zoloft,
Anafranil, and Prozac), (3) anti-psychotic medications (used to treat
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, autism, Tourette's syndrome, and severe
conduct disorders and aggression, such as Haldol, Seroquel, and
Risperdal), and (4) "mood stabilizing" medications (used to treat bipolar
disorder, such as Depakote and Lithobid).44 The risks of using any of these
psychotropic medications are high, with well-documented side effects such
as tardive dyskinesia, liver damage, growth retardation, suicide, psychosis,
permanent brain damage, heart failure, and even death.45 Indeed, "it is
41 Laura Weiss Roberts & Shali Jain, Ethical Issues in Psychopharmacology: Considerations for Clinical
Practice, 28 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 50, 50-56 (2011) (noting that: "throughout treatment, a high standard of
informed consent - along with other safeguards essential to clinical practice - should be maintained.").
42 Id.
43 Angela Olivia Burton, They Use It Like Candy: How the Prescription of Psychotropic Drugs to State-
Involved Children Violates International Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 453, 466 (2010); see also Myers, 138
P.3d at 241.
44 See St. Luke's Health Initiatives, Flashpoint: Children, Adolescents, and Psychotropic Medications,
ARIZONA HEALTH FUTURES (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.slhi.org/pdfs/issue-briefs/ib-2006-
August.pdf [hereinafter St. Luke's Health Initiatives].
45 See, e.g., Peter Breggin, Psychostimulants in the Treatment of Children Diagnosed with ADHD, 12 INT'L
JOURNAL OF RISK & SAFETY IN MED. 3, 3-29 (1993); see also JACKSON, supra note 1, at 267-97; Burton,
supra note 43, at 467; Talati, supra note 11, at 187; Myers, 138 P.3d at 241-42 ("Tardive dyskinesia
involves 'slow, rhythmical, repetitive, involuntary movements of the mouth, lips, and tongue; it is
permanent, and its symptoms cannot currently be treated.").
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difficult to imagine intrusions on the body that are more significant than
the administration of psychotropic medication.
4 6
Moreover, because the underlying causes of all mental health
disorders remain unknown, any treatment for such presumed disorders
with psychotropic mediation is necessarily experimental.47 As one scholar
has aptly noted:
The approach to treating a patient with mental illness is, as a
whole, not a precise science. While there is a substantial degree
of variability that accompanies the treatment of any condition
with medication, in the treatment of mental illness, "trial and
error" is more norm than the exception. Knowledge regarding
treatment is incomplete largely because knowledge about mental
illness is itself incomplete. Therefore, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for the physician to assert that treatment for mental
illness will be beneficial in any given case because she simply
cannot know this a priori. Antipsychotic drugs do not promise to
cure mental illness; at best, they offer a reduction in some, but
not all, debilitating symptoms associated with mental illness. In
a substantial number of patients, medication will not provide
any benefit, and rarely will medication provide complete relief.
Because of the lack of effective interventions in treating mental
illness, the physician faces special problems in meeting her duty
of disclosure in a meaningful way. The physician will be able
technically to meet her duty of disclosure because the duty
expects her to reveal what she knows (and logically cannot
expect more); however, while legally appropriate, this still may
leave the patient to decide without information that is material to
an adequately weighed decision.48
Considering the high risks and uncertain benefits of psychotropic
medication to treat mental health disorders of unknown origins, it is not
46 Talati, supra note 11, at 187; see Myers, 138 P.3d at 242 ("[M]any states have equated the intrusiveness
of psychotropic medication with the intrusiveness of electroconvulsive therapy and psychosurgery.").
47 See ROBERT WHIT-AKER, ANATOMY OF AN EPIDEMIC: MAGIC BULLETS, PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS, & THE
ASTONISHING RISE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN AM. 77-78 (2010) (noting that although mental health disorders
are often touted as diseases caused by "chemical imbalances," there is no evidence to support such claims);
see also Samantha Godwin, Bad Science Makes Bad Law: How the Deference Afforded to Psychiatry
Undermines Civil Liberties, 10 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 647, 649 (2012) ("Authoritative research has not
conclusively demonstrated any specific biological causes for mental disorders."); THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE
MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS, Preface xii (2010) ("The claim that "mental illnesses are diagnosable disorders
of the brain" is not based on scientific research; it is a lie, an error, or a natve revival of the somatic premise
of the long-discredited humoral theory of disease."); Burton, supra note 43, at 498 ("[T]he DSM-IV editors
candidly acknowledge that 'there is no objective marker that can identify a large majority of mental
disorders; diagnosis is a judgment call based on an interview and/or observation of behavior."').
48 See Talati, supra note 11, at 186.
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surprising that studies have consistently indicated patient preference for
drug-free alternatives to medication, as well as a desire for more informa-
tion regarding the availability of such drug-free alternatives.49 Unfortu-
nately, other studies have also indicated that many prescribing physicians
do not provide such alternative treatment options to psychotropic medica-
tion to their mental health patients, even where compelling evidence sug-
gests that effective alternatives exist.5" One apparent example of collective
physician non-disclosure of available alternatives to medication arises in
the context of treatment for ADHD.
Ill. A CASE STUDY IN PHYSICIAN NON-DISCLOSURE OF A
SAFER ALTERNATIVE: ADHD, PSYCHOTROPIC MEDICATION,
AND THE ADHD-DIET LINK
It would seem axiomatic that what a person chooses to eat, or fails to
eat, would have a significant impact not only on one's physical health, but
also one's mental health. 51 Nevertheless, despite the fact that numerous
scientific studies have positively linked various mental health issues and
specific learning disorders to nutritional factors, there remains a lack of
disciplinary convergence between nutritional health and mental health.52
49 See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 1-7.
50 See generally JACKSON, supra note 1, at 148-50, 259 & 200-301 (noting a number of studies showing
successful non-pharmacological approaches to treating various mental health disorders - and the lack of
disclosure of such alternatives); Connie Lenz, Prescribing a Legislative Response: Educators, Physicians
and Psychotropic Medication for Children, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 72, 92 (2006) (noting that
physicians rarely disclose risks or alternative treatment options to stimulant medications).
51 See, e.g., CAROL SIMONTACCHI, THE CRAZYMAKERS: HOW THE FOOD INDUSTRY IS DESTROYING OUR
BRAINS & HARMING OUR CHILDREN 2 (2007) (Simontacchi, a registered dietician, presents a compelling
history of the decline of American children's mental health as a result of the chemicals, additives, and
preservatives contained in their daily food supplies, noting that "Food is different now. Now, we are sold
packages, boxes, artificial flavors, coloring agents, and pseudo-foods that strip the body and leave the brain
poverty-stricken. The product is colorful and flavorful, but not from natural goodness. The colors come
from a chemist's beaker, from FD & C Blue No. 1, Red No. 40, and Yellow No. 5, or from cochineal (from
the female insect, coccus cacti from the West Indies). The flavor comes from allyl antranilate or isopulegol
or linalyl benzoate or methyl detla-ionone, while gravies and sauces are thickened with wood fiber and
emulsified by diocytl sodium sulfo-succinate. While some of these agents have been tested for carcinogenic
properties, virtually none have been studied to learn their impact on brain chemistry... We carve a culture
out of our favorite food icons and we don't link the food artifacts with the depression, the anger, and the
heartbreaking assortment of mental illnesses that beset us.").
52 See discussion infra Sec. III-B; see also, e.g., Shaheen E. Lakhan & Karen F. Viera, Nutritional
Therapies for Mental Disorders, NUTRITION JOURNAL 7:2 (2008), available at
http://www.nutritionj.com/content/7/l/2 ("researchers have observed that the prevalence of mental health
disorders has increased in developed countries in correlation with the deterioration of the Western diet.");
Luke T. Curtis & Kalpana Patel, Nutritional and Environmental Approaches to Preventing and Treating
Autism and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: A Review, 14 JOURNAL OF ALT. & COMPLEMENTARY
MED. 79, 79 (2008) ("much recent research has suggested that nutritional and environmental factors also
play a major role in the development of autism and ADHD disorders."). For other studies linking particular
mental health or specific learning disorders with diet-based causes, see Michael Huss et. al,
Supplementation of Polyunsaturated Fatty Acids, Magnesium, and Zinc in Children Seeking Medical
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This disconnect is apparent in both the suggested clinical treatment
protocols for various mental health conditions promulgated by the relevant
prescribing physician communities such as the APA, the AAP, and the
AACAP, as well as in the standard "informed consent" forms that mental
health patients are routinely given by their treating physicians when
psychotropic medication is prescribed.5 3  Nowhere is this lack of
disciplinary convergence between mental health and physical health more
noticeable than in the treatment of Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder, where the connection between the behavioral symptoms
associated with ADHD and diet has been hypothesized, studied, and, some
would argue, ignored, by the mainstream prescribing physician community
for over forty years.5 4
A. ADHD and the Current Recommended Treatment of
Psychotropic Medication
ADHD, now the most commonly diagnosed childhood mental health
disorder in the United States, did not show up in psychiatry's Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual (DSM) as a recognized and separate mental health
disorder until 1980.55 Like every other presumed mental health disorder in
the DSM, there is no laboratory or other definitive medical test to
Advice for Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Problems: An Observational Cohort Study, 9 LIPIDS IN HEALTH
& DISEASE 105 (2010); Alexandra J. Richardson & Paul Montgomery, The Oxford-Durham Study: A
Randomized Controlled Trial of Dietary Supplementation with Fatty Acids in Children with Developmental
Coordination Disorder, 115 PEDIATRICS 1360 (2005); Banarasi D. Tiwari et. al., Learning Disabilities and
Poor Motivation to Achieve Due to Prolonged Iodine Deficiency, 63 AM. J. CLIN. NUTR. 782 (1996); R W.
Thatcher & M.L. Lester, Nutrition, Environmental Toxins, and ComptterizedE KEG: A Mini-Max Approach
to Learning Disabilities, 18 1. LEARNING DISABILITIES 287 (1985); see also M.K. Watts, Nutritional
Therapy in Practice for Learning, Behavioural, and Mood Disorders, 20 NUTRITION & HEALTH 239, 239
(2011) ("There is an evidential link between diet, mood, and behavior, but a shortage of formalized
educational literature covering the role of nutritional science and its application in the care and treatment of
mental health problems.. Nutritional Therapists are not currently part of the multidisciplinary team
assessing people suffering from mental health problems.").
53 Compare State of Wisconsin's Department of Health Services Informed Consent for Medication form F-
24277, WISCONSIN DEPT. OF HEALTH SERVS. (2010), available at
http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/formsl/F2/F24277_blank.pdf, with David Cohen & David Jacobs, A Model
Consent Form for Psychiatric Drug Treatment, JOURNAL OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY (Winter 2000),
available at
http://psychrights.org/Research/Digest/InformedConsent/DCohenmodelinformedconsentfonrm.htm; see also
AAP CLINICAL GUIDELINES & AACAP PRACTICE PARAMETER infra notes 63 & 64.
54 See Roseanne Schnoll et al., Nutrition in the Treatment of Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder: A
Neglected but Important Aspect, 28 APPLIED PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY & BIOFEEDBACK 63, 63-75 (Mar. 2003).
55 WHITAKER, supra note 47, at 218. The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition ("DSM-V"), categorizes all psychiatric disorders. It also lists
alleged causes of these disorders, statistics in terms of gender, age at onset, and prognosis, as well as some
research concerning the optimal treatment approaches. See Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, ALLPYSCH ONLINE, http://allpsych.com/disorders/index.html (last accessed Aug. 2, 2013)
[hereinafter DSM-Vj.
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determine whether a person "has" ADHD. Instead, an individual is
diagnosed with the ADHD disorder based on an assessment of certain
behavioral criteria.56 In the case of ADHD, a person must show six or
more symptoms of either inattention or hyperactivity for at least six
months, and some "impairment" from these symptoms must be present in
two or more settings, generally home and school.57
Despite the DSM inclusion, the very authenticity of ADHD as a true
mental health disorder has provoked considerable controversy over the last
few decades.58 On one side of the controversy are those who believe that
ADHD is a serious, well-documented "chronic disorder" affecting millions
of children and adults, and that treatment with ADHD stimulant
medications, most commonly methylphenidate, is the safest and most
effective treatment protocol to unlock such ADHD sufferers' true
potential.59 On the other side of the controversy are those who question the
ADHD diagnosis itself, or who believe that even if certain behavioral
symptoms associated with the purported disorder are genuine, the single
modality method of "treating" the symptoms with dangerous psychotropic
medications with known serious side effects is morally reprehensible,
particularly when the decision is being made for someone other than the
person taking the medication, such as a child.6°
Regardless of the debate, the diagnosis of childhood ADHD
continues to rise at epidemic rates, along with a concurrent rise in
prescriptions for psychotropic medication to control the behavioral
symptoms associated with this disorder. 61 The United States is now the
consumer of over 85% of the world's supply of methylphenidate, a
controlled Schedule II narcotic, despite early consensus that psychotropic
medication such as methylphenidate should only be used in the most
severe cases of ADHD, and only after other, safer treatment alternatives
had proven ineffective.62 Indeed, in the 2011 American Academy of
56 See CDC, supra note 5 (ADHD is characterized by "developmentally inappropriate levels of inattention
and hyperactivity, resulting in functional impairment in academic, family, and social settings.").
57 See DSM-V, supra note 55; see also Lenz, supra note 50, at 74-75.
58 Lenz, supra note 50, at 73 ("the very existence of ADHD as a valid disorder has fueled much debate");
see St. Luke's Health Initiatives, supra note 44, at 2.
59 St. Luke's Health Initiatives, supra note 44, at 2.
60 Id at 2; see Burton, supra note 43.
61 See CDC, supra note 5.
62 See St. Luke's Health Initiatives, supra note 44, at 11 (United States is consumer of over 85% of the
world's supply of methylphenidate). A "controlled narcotic" is a drug deemed to have great potential for
addiction, abuse and diversion into the illegal drug trade. Because of these dangers, such narcotics are
designated as controlled substances and their medicinal uses are stringently regulated by the international
community under the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances ("1971 Convention").
Because of its high potential for abuse, methylphenidate was one of the first substances placed under
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Pediatrics' (AAP) Clinical Practice Guideline for the Diagnosis,
Evaluation, and Treatment of ADHD in Children and Adolescents, the
AAP now recommends psychotropic medication as the first line of
treatment for ADHD-diagnosed children as young as five years old, and as
a viable treatment option for children as young as four.63 The American
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry (AACAP) offers similar
recommendations. 64 The shift to using psychotropic medication as the
primary method of treatment for a disorder still the subject of considerable
controversy seems near complete.
65
Yet, even proponents of this pharmacological approach acknowledge
that stimulant medication is hardly risk-free. Side effects range from mild
nervousness, nausea, insomnia, and decreased appetite, to heart
irregularities, suicidal ideations, increased risk of violent and addictive
behavior, and even death.66 Moreover, despite earlier claims that stimulant
medication such as methylphenidate was "highly effective" in treating
ADHD, a number of recent studies have indicated otherwise.67 In fact, in
the most significant long-term study conducted on the effects of stimulant
medication on ADHD children, the Multisite Multimodal Treatment Study
(the "MTA Study"), the authors noted that at the 36-month mark,
"medication use was a significant marker, not of beneficial outcome, but
of deterioration., 68 Follow up and additional studies on the use of
stimulants to treat ADHD have supported this negative assessment. 69 As
one physician and author notes:
international control in the 1971 Convention's Schedule II. Burton, supra note 43, at 456; see International
Narcotics Control Board, Green List (24th ed. May 2010, available at
http://ww.incb.org/documents/Psyehtropicyllgreen-istsiGreen-listENG_2014_85222_GHB.pdf
63 American Academy of Pediatrics, ADHD: Clinical Practice Guideline for the Diagnosis, Evaluation,
and Treatment of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in Children and Adolescents, 128 PEDIATRICS
1007, 1008 (2011), available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/128/5/1007.full.pdf+html
[hereinafter AAP CLINICAL GUIDELINES].
64 American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Practice Parameter for the Assessment and
Treatment of Children and Adolescents with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, 46 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD. ADOLSEC. PSYCHIATRY 894, 907 (2007) [hereinafter AACAP PRACTICE PARAMETER].
65 See, e.g., Hoagwood K. et al., Treatment Services for Children with ADHD: A National Perspective, 39
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 198-206 (2000) (noting that "major shifts have occurred in
stimulant prescriptions since 1989, with prescriptions now comprising three-fourths of all visits to
physicians by children with ADHD.").
66 See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 267-99.
67 See id.; see also Burton, supra note 43, at 462-63.
68 Whittaker, supra note 47, at 227 (citing P. Jensen, 3-Year Follow-Up of the NIMH MTA-Study, 46 J.
AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 989, 989-1002 (2007)).
69 See, e.g., B. Molina, Delinquent Behavior and Emerging Substance Abuse in the MTA at 36 Months, 46
J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY, 1028-39 (2007) (stating that relative to normative
comparative group, MTA children had significantly higher rates of delinquency); see also B. Molina, MTA
at 8 years, 48 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESC. PSYCHIATRY 484-98 (2009); Whittaker, supra note 47,
at 227.
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According to their advocates, nothing "works" as effectively for
inattention or hyperactivity as stimulant medications. The
overwhelming majority of articles appearing in medical
textbooks and journals on the subject of ADHD present
stimulants as the gold standard of treatment, with a reported
efficacy rate of 70-90%. By efficacy (favorable short term
response) it is suggested that children become less impulsive,
less fidgety, and more focused. However, it is important to
appreciate the quality of the studies, which have been
responsible for the construction of this opinion. A meta-analysis
of sixty-two randomized controlled trials (RCTs) involving
almost 3000 subjects with a primary diagnosis of ADHD
demonstrated weak findings for short acting Ritalin. Thirty-nine
percent of published trials were of low quality, 26% of the trials
reported results of Ritalin along with additional drugs or
interventions; and at least eight trials suppressed teacher data,
which showed poorer Ritalin effects. Moreover, all trials noted
significant adverse effects. . .based upon these findings, the
[meta-analysis] authors concluded that 'broad generalizations
about the usefulness of Ritalin should probably be avoided,
particularly due to the lack of long term trial evidence.'
However, long-term studies have been conducted, and these
investigations reinforce the opinion that stimulant utility is
limited. v
Even medication advocates who had once sought to establish the
superiority of medication have conceded that "stimulants do not produce
lasting improvements in aggressivity, conduct disorder, criminality,
education achievement, job functioning, marital relationships, or long-term
adjustment."'" In short, stimulant medication to treat ADHD is hardly the
panacea it was originally touted to be, and many researchers and
physicians are now arriving at the conclusion that such medication may do
significantly more harm to ADHD patients than good in the long-term.72
Given this growing body of evidence undermining the mainstream
mental health community's position on stimulant medication as a safe and
70 JACKSON, supra note 1, at 273; see Burton, supra note 43, at 462-63 (discussing a 2010 study which
indicated that children diagnosed with ADHD who had been treated with stimulants were found to be ten
and a half times more likely to have been identified by a classroom teacher as performing below age-level,
and had significantly greater diastolic blood pressure than ADHD-diagnosed children who had never
received medication); Whittaker, supra note 47, at 227.
71 Breggin, supra note 45, at 28 (discussing numerous studies establishing the high risk and/or low
effectiveness of ADHD medications).
72 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 1, at 267-97 (long-term effects may include permanent negative changes
to brain chemistry, heart disease, growth retardation, addiction to other recreational drugs, and psychosis).
2014]
86 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW [VOL. 16.1:67
effective form of treatment for ADHD-associated behaviors, it is no
surprise that many ADHD patients and/or their legal surrogates want to
know about alternative treatment options to such medication. 73 However,
studies have shown that patients and physicians have differing views on
how much information needs to be disclosed, with patients wanting
significantly more information regarding alternative treatments than their
physicians seem willing to provide.74 Reasons for this growing divide
between what patients want to know and what physicians disclose to them
are undoubtedly manifold. Physicians may be affected by managed care
concerns or other time pressures, or may be genuinely uncomfortable with
recommending available treatments outside of their areas of medical
expertise.75 Others, however, do not provide such material information
regarding alternative treatments to their patients because they insist that
alternatives simply do not exist, even with available scientific literature to
the contrary.76
B. The ADHD-Diet Studies: Is Diet a Viable Alternative Treatment
Option?
ADHD - it's just a couple of symptoms. It's not a disease.
There is a paradigm shift needed. If a child is diagnosed with
73 See, e.g., Debbie Schacter & Irwin Kleinman, Informed Consent and Disclosure of Information for
Stimulant Medication: An Exploratory Study of Teenagers', Parents' and Physicians' Preferences for
Information Disclosure, 5 JOURNAL OF ETHICS IN MENTAL HEALTH 1, 4 (2011); see also JACKSON, supra
note 1, at 5 (noting that "multiple contemporary surveys around the world reflect a public preference for the
non-drug treatment of psychiatric conditions. Consumers convey significant doubt about the effectiveness
of psychotropic medications, and substantial concern about their potential to harm the body or cause
maladaptive changes (addiction).").
74 Schacter, supra at 4; JACKSON, supra note 1, at 5; see Alexander G. Fiks et al., Contrasting Parents' and
Pediatricians' Perspectives on Shared Decision-Making in ADHD, 127 PEDIATRICS e188, e190 (2011)
("Parents emphasized the importance of clinicians providing information regarding all treatment options.
They reacted negatively to doctors who 'pushed' medication without offering a balanced presentation of
alternatives.")
75 See generally Lakhan supra note 52, at 5 ("There is tremendous resistance to using [nutritional]
supplements as treatments from clinicians, mostly due to their lack of knowledge on the subject. Others
would rather use prescription drugs that the drug companies and the FDA researches, monitors, and recalls
if necessary."); Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case, 6
WASH. L. REV. 367, 392 (1986) (noting that physicians often do not inform patients about non-drug or
nutritional alternatives because they simply do not know enough about these alternatives themselves); see
also Morris, supra note 13, at 347-48 (noting that physicians can no longer be trusted to place the
individual patient's medical interest above all other interests. Managed care imposes upon them a
requirement that they divide their loyalties).
76 See, e.g., Carl Sherman, Nutrition, Diet and Non-Drug ADHD Treatments, ADDitude Magazine (Jan.
29, 2011), http://adhdinvasion.blogspot.com/201 1/01/nutrition-diet-and-non-drug-adhd.html ("ADI{D isn't
caused by an allergic reaction to food or anything in food, including additives. The evidence to support
elimination diets or tests for food sensitivities simply doesn't exist."); but see JACKSON, supra note 1, at
190 ("Just as political and cultural institutions have failed the mentally ill, so too have professional opinions
about the kinds of interventions which appear to be most helpful.").
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ADHD, we should say, 'ok, we have got those symptoms, now
let's start looking for a cause.' In all children, we should start
with diet research. If a child's behavior doesn't change, then
drugs may still be necessary. But now we are giving them all
drugs, and I think that is a huge mistake.77
In contrast to the developing body of evidence showing that stimulant
medication is neither as safe nor as effective as originally proclaimed, the
evidence suggesting an alternative treatment option through diet-based
protocols is steadily increasing.78
In the early 1970's, Dr. Benjamin Feingold was one of the first
physicians to suggest a causal connection between dietary factors and the
behavioral symptoms now associated with the ADHD diagnosis. 79 His
"Feingold Elimination Diet" was based upon his belief that hyperactive
behavior in most children was primarily caused by certain artificial food
colors, flavors, and preservatives found in the children's diets. 80 Feingold
maintained that such hyperactive behavior could be effectively addressed
without psychotropic medication simply by removing such food-based
irritants from these children's diets.8 Although many parents reported
success with their own children on the Feingold elimination diet protocol,
early scientific studies testing the Feingold treatment protocol produced
mixed results.82 Later, the results of most of these early studies were
deemed inconclusive due to their small study size or allegedly unscientific
methodologies, but studies on the connection between diet and ADHD-
identified behaviors continued.83
77 See National Public Radio staff, Study: Diet May Help ADHD Kids More Than Drugs (Mar. 12, 2011),
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/12/134456594/study-diet-may-help-kids-more-than-drugs (last accessed July
10, 2013) (interview with INCA study lead researcher/author Dr. Lidy Pelsser).
78 See discussion infra Sec. III-B.
79 See, e.g., Irene Burka et al., Food Additives, Essential Nutrients and Neurodevelopmental Behavioral
Disorders in Children: A Brief Review, 16 PEDIATRIC & CHILD HEALTH e54, e54 (2011).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. (noting that "studies from the 1970's and 1980's cautiously supporting the behavioral benefits of
diets free from synthetic food dyes and additives were counteracted by negative ones."); see Schnoll, supra
note 54, at 64-66.
83 In essence, ADHD-diet studies can generally be classified into one of two theoretical approaches: a
"nutritional deficiency" theory, which posits that ADHD symptoms are generally caused by a lack, or low
concentration of, certain vital nutrients deemed essential to healthy brain development and functioning, or
an "allergic reaction theory," which posits that ADHD-like symptoms are actually caused by allergic
reactions to certain foods or non-foods in the child's food supply. See, e.g., articles, supra note 52. The
major criticism of earlier ADHD-diet studies was the failure to put into place scientifically-recognized
control mechanisms, such as double-blinded, placebo controls. See, e.g., Ronald E. Kleinman et al., A
Research Model for Investigating the Effects of Artificial Food Colorings on Children with ADHD, 127
PEDIATRICS e 1575, e1580 (2011) ("because most existing controlled studies of [artificial food coloring) and
ADHD were conducted in the 1970's and 1980's, outcomes are not consistent with the current standards
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Recently, a number of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCT's) have
given serious weight to the ADHD-diet connection, and have presumably
addressed the scientific community's criticism of earlier methodologies.
1. The Southampton Study
In 2007, the U.K. government, through its British Food Services
Agency, sponsored the Southampton Study.84 In this study, researchers
built upon a previous 2004 double-blind placebo-controlled study of pre-
school children that revealed that children who were initially put on a diet
free of artificial dyes and benzoate preservatives subsequently exhibited
increased hyperactivity when given a drink containing such preservatives
and dyes. The Southampton Study expanded upon this 2004 study to
include 153 three-year-olds and 144 eight and nine-year-olds who were
representative of the general population. The study, which was published
in the U.K. scientific periodical The Lancet, showed a statistically
significant increase in negative ADHD-associated behaviors when children
were given drinks with the identified dyes and preservatives. Although the
researchers did not go so far as to claim that food additives "cause
clinically defined ADHD," the researchers nevertheless concluded that
their results "strongly support[ed] a relationship between food additives
and [ADHD-associated] behaviors. s85 After reviewing these results, the
British Food Services Agency asked U.K. food manufacturers to
voluntarily remove such colorings and preservatives from their food
products.86 Encouraged by the British Food Services Agency's proactive
actions, health advocates in the United States lobbied the Food and Drug
Administration to take similar actions with respect to the use of such
colorings and preservatives in U.S. food supplies. The FDA declined to
take such action.8 7
required of research on ADHD."); see also Schnoll, supra note 54, at 64-65.
84 Donna McCann, et al., Food Additives and Hyperactive Behaviour in 3 Year Old and 8/9-Year-Old
Children in the Community: A Randomised, Double-Blinded Placebo-Controlled Trial, 370 THE LANCET
1560-67 (2007).
85 Id.; see Julie R. Barrett, Hyperactive Ingredients?, 115 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES A578, A578
(Dec. 2007).
86 Burka, supra note 79, at e55.
87 See Background Document for the Food Advisory Committee: Certified Color Additives in Food and
Possible Association with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in Children, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Mar. 30-31, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/
CommitteesMeetingMaterials/FoodAdvisoryCommitteefUCM248549.pdf ("Based on our review of the
data from published literature, FDA concludes that a causal relationship between exposure to color
additives and hyperactivity in children in the general population has not been established.").
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2. The SAD Study
In 2010, another study was conducted in Australia by the Telethon
Institute for Child Health Research, known as the SAD study.88 The study,
which was published in the Journal of Attention Disorders, looked at the
dietary patterns of 1,800 adolescents from the long-term Raine Study and
classified diets as having "healthy" or "western" patterns. 89 The "healthy"
diet was characterized by a high intake of fresh fruit and vegetables, whole
grains and fish, and tended to be higher in omega-3 fatty acids, folate, and
fiber.90 The "western" diet was characterized by a tendency towards take-
out foods, confectionary, processed, fried, and refined foods, and tended to
be higher in total fat, saturated fat, refined sugar, and sodium.91 The SAD
study results showed that the diet high in the western pattern of foods was
associated with more than double the risk of having an ADHD diagnosis
compared with a healthy diet pattern, after adjusting for other social and
family influences. Although the researchers did not conclude that ADHD
was "caused" by the diet-based factors, the researchers did conclude that
more studies were needed to uncover what was behind the clearly
observed link. 92
3. The INCA Study
Finally, in 2011, the ADHD Centre in the Netherlands conducted the
INCA study, a five-week, double-blind study with 100 children enrolled
between the ages of four to eight who had been identified as having
ADHD.93 During this five week period, children were assigned to either a
restricted diet group or a control group. Remarkably, in the restricted diet
group, when the identified food irritants were removed from the children's
diets, 64% of these ADHD-identified children ceased behaviors associated
88 See Amber L. Howard, et al., ADHD Is Associated with a Western Dietary Pattern in Adolescents, 15
JOURNAL OF ATTENTION DISORDERS 403-11 (2010) [hereinafter SAD STUDY] ("SAD" refers to the
Standard American Diet, which is also referred to as a "Western" diet in this study).
89 Id. at 405; see About Us, RAINE STUDY, http://www.rainestudy.org.au/about/what_(last accessed July 31,
2013) (The Raine Study is a long-term Australian health study started in 1989 involving 2900 pregnant
women and their eventual offspring. The women were assessed at various stages of their pregnancy and
during this time, information was collected on the mother and the father, such as information on each
parent's diet, exercise, work, health, etc. After the children were bom, the children were assessed over the
years, and information on their height, weight, eating, walking, talking, eating, behavior, any medical
conditions or illness was, and continues to be, collected.).
90 SAD STUDY, supra note 88, at 404.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 409; see Jess Halliday, ADHD Could Be Linked to Diet, FOODNAVIGATOR.COM (July 30, 2010),
www.foodnavigator.com/content/view/print/314196 (discussing SAD Study results).
93 See Pelsser, supra note 6, at 494.
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with ADHD altogether.94 The results of this INCA study, which were also
published in The Lancet in 2011, prompted the main author of the study to
conclude that the majority of ADHD-identified children are more likely
suffering from a hypersensitivity to certain foods than from a true
"disease."
95
In addition to such individual high-profile studies, several recent
meta-analyses of all of the available published studies on diet and ADHD
in the last decade have also concluded that the weight of the evidence
supports the conclusion that diet is causally connected to the behavioral
symptoms associated with ADHD.9 6 Consequently, many researchers have
concluded that diet should be considered as an important modifiable factor
in any ADHD treatment protocol, and ideally before stimulant medication
is prescribed. 97
Nevertheless, despite a growing call to consider and disclose diet-
based alternatives to psychotropic medication, particularly outside of the
United States, the mainstream prescribing physician communities within
the United States appear unconvinced. 98 Specifically, the most recent
clinical guidelines of both the American Academy of Pediatrics and the
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatrists (AACAP) do
not disclose the positive results of these RCT's or meta-analyses in their
clinical guidelines at all, nor do they offer any information regarding
possible diet-based treatment alternatives to the recommended stimulant
medication. In fact, the AACAP Practice Parameter, without much
94 Id. at 500.
95 See NPR, supra note 77 (interviewing lead author of the INCA study, Dr. Peisser, who concluded:
"We've got good news - that food is the main cause of ADHD. We've got bad news - that we have to train
physicians to monitor this procedure because it cannot be done by a physician who is not trained.").
96 See Burka, supra note 79, at e54 ("The authors believe there is enough evidence to consider dietary
influences as a modifiable risk factor"); Curtis, supra note 52, at 79 ("[M]uch recent research has suggested
that nutritional and environmental factors also play a major role in the development of autism and ADHD
disorders.").
97 See, e.g., Millchap & Yee, The Diet Factor in Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, 129 PEDIATRICS
330, 330 (2012)("A greater attention to the education of parents and children in a healthy dietary pattern,
omitting items shown to predispose to ADHD, is perhaps the most promising and practical complementary
or alternative treatment of ADHD."); Schnoll, supra note 54, at 63 ("In general, diet modification plays a
major role in the management of ADHD and should be considered as part of the treatment protocol.);
Natalie Sinn, Nutritional and Dietary Influences on Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, International
Life Sciences Institute, 66 NUTRITION REVIEWS 558, 559 (2011) ("It may be more prudent to address
ADHD symptoms with a nutritional and dietary approach before prescribing medications.").
98 This author acknowledges that many individual prescribing physicians within the U.S. may indeed be
disclosing available alternative treatments to psychotropic medications as part of their clinical practice.
However, this article also assumes that many practitioners rely upon the clinical guidelines and practice
parameters of their respective professional organizations, such as the AAP, APA, and the AACAP, to make
their treatment recommendations. Accordingly, this author believes that the failure of these guidelines to
disclose information regarding available alternative treatment options is significant and may suggest
pervasive nondisclosure.
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elaboration, suggests either that these recent RCT's supporting non-
pharmacological approaches do not exist, or do not justify any change in
the drug treatment protocol. 99
Of course, a strong correlation doesn't necessarily indicate causation,
and mainstream physicians may very well reasonably conclude that such
diet-based treatment alternatives have not been proven effective to their
own medically trained satisfaction. However, given the availability of the
published scientific literature supporting diet-based causal connections,
and studies showing clear patient preference for drug-free alternatives,
shouldn't a prescribing physician disclose this available alternative
treatment information to his or her ADHD patient, regardless of the
physician's own beliefs as to the alternative's efficacy or effectiveness?
And wouldn't a patient deprived of this material information have a legal
cause to complain that she or he did not give informed consent to the
recommended treatment of medication?
Case law, unfortunately, does not support either supposition, which
perhaps explains why many physicians continue to shirk their full
disclosure obligations.
IV. COURT BASED DEFERENCE TO PHYSICIAN
PREFERENCE: WHY PRESCRIBING PHYSICIANS FAIL TO
DISCLOSE AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT
OPTIONS TO THEIR MENTAL HEALTH PATIENTS
Although there are a few cases regarding a physician's failure to
inform patients about the risks of psychotropic medication, there are
virtually no published cases addressing the failure of a physician to
disclose a specific alternative treatment to psychotropic medication. °°
Nevertheless, analogous case law in both medical community and
99 See AACAP PRACTICE PARAMETER, supra note 64, at 903 (opining that the 1997 AACAP practice
parameter, which reviewed and rejected a variety of non-pharmacological interventions for ADHD
including dietary modification, was still valid, since "no studies have appeared since then to justify [any
non-pharmacological intervention's] use."); see also AAP CLINICAL GUIDELINES, supra note 63, at 1010
(indicating diet-based RCT's not considered during AAP's evidence review process). Notably, although the
pharmaceutical companies and CHADD are represented on the respective committee/clinical boards
making these pharmacological treatment recommendations, nutritional experts are not. CHADD, or
Children and Adults with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, is a national non-profit organization
founded in 1987, allegedly for the purposes of education, advocacy and support. However, despite
CHADD's claim to be a "support group," CHADD has been repeatedly criticized by the World Health
Organization and others for serving as a conduit for pharmaceutical company advertising and lobbying, in
violation of the 1971 Psychotropic Drugs Convention. See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 262; see also
Whittaker, supra note 47, at 220-21 (discussing the pro-drug lobbying efforts of CHADD).
100 See Lenz, supra note 50, at 77-84 for a discussion of cases discussing a physician's failure to disclose
the risks of the psychotropic medication.
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reasonable patient jurisdictions illustrates why mental health patients will
be unlikely to establish a viable informed consent claim against their
physicians for failing to disclose unrecognized drug-free alternatives to
medication - and thus why mainstream prescribing physicians may
continue to recommend psychotropic medications despite patient
preference and evidence that alternative treatments are indeed available.
A. Alternative Treatment Disclosures Under the Medical-
Community Standard
Because the medical community standard only requires that a
physician disclose those treatment alternatives that a reasonable physician
in his or her particular medical community would ordinarily disclose, it is
hard to imagine a physician disclosing any alternative treatments
unrecognized by his or her own conventional medical community. Indeed,
the limits of the medical-community standard are aptly illustrated in the
case of Moore v. Baker.101
In Moore, a patient sued her surgeon for recommending a
neurosurgical procedure known as a carotid endarterectomy to fix a
blockage that was impeding the flow of oxygen to her brain, without
disclosing the availability of an unconventional alternative treatment
known as EDTA therapy.' °2 Blood clot complications arose following the
recommended surgery, and the patient suffered permanent and severe
brain damage. In her complaint against the surgeon, the patient alleged
that the surgeon violated Georgia's physician-oriented informed consent
law because he failed to tell the patient about a known alternative, EDTA
therapy, which the patient claimed was not only as effective as the
recommended surgery, but also did not entail the same high risks. In
support of her claim, the patient produced two affidavits from medical
practitioners: one an osteopathic doctor (D.O.), and one a traditional
allopathic doctor (M.D.).' °3 Both experts opined that the EDTA therapy
should be considered by the mainstream medical community as a viable
alternative to surgery. The surgeon moved for summary judgment in
response, and produced evidence suggesting that EDTA therapy was not
recognized by the mainstream medical community.
101 989 F.2d 1129 (1llth Cir. 1993).
102 Id. at 1130 (EDTA therapy stands for ethylene diamine tetra acetic chelation therapy).
103 Id. at 1133; see What is Osteopathic Medicine?, AM. ASS'N OF COLL. OF OSTEOPATHIC MED.
(AACOM), http://www.aacom.org/about/osteomed/Pages/default.aspx (last accessed Nov. 26, 2013)
("Osteopathic physicians, also known as DO's, work in partnership with their patients. They consider the
impact that lifestyle and community have on the health of each individual, and they work to break down
barriers to good health.").
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Rather than simply allowing the claim to go forward for a jury to
decide, the lower district court granted the surgeon's motion for summary
judgment, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the
mainstream medical community did not recognize or accept EDTA as an
alternative to the recommended surgery, that the physician had not
received medical training in EDTA therapy, and that no one at the Medical
College of Georgia had either taught the alternative therapy or recognized
it as a practical alternative.
0 4
Yet, the patient was not insisting that the physician or even anyone
else within the mainstream medical community perform the EDTA
alternative, but merely that the physician should have disclosed the known
available alternative to the patient, so that the patient could have made her
own treatment decisions. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit stated,
"Georgia's informed consent law does not require physicians to inform
patients of all alternatives to surgery or even all the alternatives that the
medical profession should accept. The law requires only disclosure of
those alternatives that are generally recognized and accepted by reasonably
prudent physicians."'10 5
As illustrated by Moore, a patient seeking relief for a physician's
failure to disclose available but unrecognized alternative treatment options
in a medical-community jurisdiction will likely be unable to sustain a
cause of action for a lack of informed consent to a recommended
treatment, even if the patient is able to produce evidence that viable but
undisclosed alternatives exist, and that at least some practitioners would
have disclosed this information to them. The medical community standard
clearly places "low value on patient's informational needs and decision-
making autonomy... [reinforcing] society's high regard for the medical
profession while reifying well-entrenched paternalism."
' 10 6
B. Alternative Treatment Disclosures under The Reasonable
Patient Standard
The "reasonable patient standard" purportedly requires physician
disclosure of information that a reasonable patient would find material to a
treatment decision. Thus, under this standard, the focus is supposed to be
on what a reasonable person objectively needs to hear from his or her
physician to allow the patient to make an informed, intelligent decision
104 Moore, 989 F.2d at 1130.
105 Id. at 1133.
106 Bulen, supra note 20, at 337 (noting that the physician-oriented standard, in effect, "defers to the
medical community to impose its own disclosure standard.").
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regarding proposed medical treatment. Presumably, this would also
include information on all available alternatives to any recommended
treatment or any "alternative schools of thought" within the same medical
community as to the best course of treatment. Unfortunately, case law in
reasonable patient jurisdictions actually provides very little assurance that
courts will require disclosure of any alternative treatments outside of the
mainstream medical community's recognized treatments - or even require
disclosure of alternative schools of thought or debates within the very
same medical community about the best modes of treatment.
First, in many reasonable patient jurisdictions, the courts limit
disclosure of alternatives to those that are "medically reasonable," either
without clearly establishing who would determine such medical
reasonableness, or else by explicitly deferring to the mainstream medical
community for such a reasonableness determination. 10 7 Clearly, however,
by deferring to the mainstream medical community to define what is and is
not "medically reasonable," there is virtually no distinction between the
reasonable patient standard and the medical community standard.
Second, while the availability of alternatives recognized by at least
some members of the same physician community should theoretically
trigger a disclosure obligation, case law within reasonable patient
jurisdictions conflicts as to just how much "debate" or "consensus" is
needed within such a community before an alternative treatment approach
would merit physician disclosure. While some courts suggest that some
"debate" over treatment options within the relevant mainstream physician
community would trigger a physician's disclosure obligation, other courts
have refused to recognize such a disclosure obligation, even in the face of
significant debate or recognized "alternative schools of thought" over
treatment options.1 °8 For example, in the California case of Parris v.
Sands, a patient who had her spleen removed thirteen years prior due to
having Hodgkin's disease, visited an emergency care clinic due to a
107 See, e.g., Stover v. Ass'n of Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surgeons, 635 A.2d 1047, 1051 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994) ("Under our view of the doctrine of informed consent, a physician would need to discuss alternate
prostheses and their relative merits only when the other prostheses represent medically recognized
alternatives."); see also Ray v. Kapiolani Med. Specialists, 259 P.3d 569, 584 (Haw. 2011) (noting that
"healthcare providers will not be overwhelmed by our holding because the plaintiff will need to show that
the medical community recognizes the different dosage as an alternative treatment.").
108 Compare Ray, 259 P.3d at 583, Bubb v. Brusky, 768 N.W.2d 903, 922 (Wis. 2009), and Jamison v.
Lindsay, 108 Cal. App. 3d 223, 231 (1980) (debate within the same medical community might trigger
physician disclosure of such debated alternatives), with Parris v. Sands, 21 Cal. App. 4th 187, 193 (1993),
Vandi v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1064, 1071 (1992), and Matthis v. Morrissey, 11
Cal. App. 4th 332, 344 (1992) (no duty to disclose alternative treatments that the individual physician does
not recommend).
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presumed upper respiratory infection.10 9 Although the patient's history of
Hodgkin's Disease suggested that she might still be immunocompromised
and might need antibiotics with upper respiratory treatment, the physician
on duty concluded that the patient was suffering from a viral infection and
thus did not recommend antibiotics. At the time of the physician's
decision, there was substantial debate within the mainstream medical
community itself regarding the length of time an asplenic patient remains
immunocompromised following a splendectomy. Several days after her
initial emergency care visit, the patient had to return, due to life-
threatening bacterial pneumonia. Because she had not received antibiotics
during the initial visit, the plaintiff consequently suffered permanent lung
damage, and sued the emergency care physician for medical negligence
and for failing to disclose the fact that there was an "alternative school of
thought" within the relevant medical community regarding whether
antibiotics were always necessary with asplenic patients.
Although expert testimony conflicted on whether the physician's
actions in failing to prescribe antibiotics fell within the allowable standard
of care, the lower court refused to grant the plaintiff's request for a jury
instruction on the physician's duty to disclose a "contrary recognized
school of thought within the medical community."" 0 Ignoring the fact that
a reasonable patient would likely have found such an alternative school of
thought material to a treatment decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed,
reasoning that physicians generally do not have a duty of disclosure
concerning an alternative treatment or procedure he does not recommend,
and that "only in the unusual case would such duty be appropriate......
Given such a puzzling outcome in a reasonable patient jurisdiction, it
should come as no surprise that courts are even more deferential to the
recommending physician where an alternative treatment is only recognized
outside of the mainstream community. This was certainly the case in the
California case of Schiff v. Prados.12 In Schiff the plaintiffs' four-year-old
daughter, Crystin, was diagnosed with a malignant brain tumor. After
removal of the tumor, defendant Dr. Prados, head of the board
recommending treatment options, recommended two options for treatment:
(1) intensive chemotherapy and radiation, or (2) taking Crystin home and
109 Parris, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 187.
110 Parris, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 192.
111 Id. at 193 (The court then indicated, in dicta, that such an unusual disclosure circumstance, where
unrecognized treatments or procedures should be disclosed, "would likely need to involve surgery, cancer
diagnosis or cancer treatment, or other serious, life threatening procedures.").
112 92 Cal. App. 4th 692 (2001).
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letting her die." 3  The parents, wary about using radiation and
chemotherapy on their young daughter, repeatedly asked about alternative
treatment options from the various physicians, including Dr. Prados, but
were repeatedly told there were no other available alternatives. As a result,
the parents chose the recommended chemotherapy and radiation for
Crystin. However, even after the initial bouts of recommended treatment,
some residual tumor remained. Not wanting to put their daughter through
more chemo and radiation, the Schiffs began researching alternative
therapies on their own. They came across a medical doctor in Texas who
had been experimenting with a new type of cancer treatment using
antineoplastons and queried Dr. Prados about this alternative treatment
option.114 Although familiar with this treatment option himself, Dr. Prados
was adamantly opposed to this alternative treatment option and tried to
steer the Schiffs towards other mainstream alternatives. 15 The Schiffs
nevertheless elected to try the alternative antineoplaston treatment, and
traveled to Texas to do so. The alternative treatment appeared to be
working, and after her initial treatments with the alternative therapy,
Crystin became cancer free.
However, six months after her successful antineoplaston treatment,
Crystin died. The cause of death was deemed due to the initial aggressive
radiation and chemotherapy treatments she had received prior to finding
out about the alternative antineoplastons treatments on their own. The
Schiffs consequently sued Dr. Prados, alleging that Dr. Prados had not
obtained their informed consent to the treatment with radiation and
chemotherapy because he had failed to advise them of the alternative
available antineoplaston treatment in Texas. Dr. Prados moved for
summary judgment on the basis that the alternative treatment option was
not "available" in California because it had not been approved by the FDA
when the Schiffs had consented to the chemotherapy and radiation therapy,
and California law required FDA approval before a physician could
perform such treatment in California. Dr. Prados further argued that he had
no duty to inform the Schiffs about an alternative treatment that he did not
recommend. The court granted the defendant's motion and the Court of
Appeal affirmed, first on the basis that there was no general duty to inform
patients of "unrecommended" treatments, and second, that in this
particular case, treatment in California with antineoplastons was
113 Schiff, 92 Cal. App. 4th at 695.
114 Id. at 696 n.] (Antineoplastons are substances derived from human urine. According to the doctor
practicing this alternative cancer treatment, when injected into the body, antineoplastons 'reprogram'
cancer cells to function normally).
115 Schiff, 92 Cal. App. 4th at 696 n. 1.
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considered illegal by California statute because it had not yet been given
FDA approval." 6 The court thus reasoned that because the treatment was
not legally "available" in California, the physician was not legally required
to disclose it."7
The Schiff court's reliance on the California statute to justify
physician nondisclosure of the available alternative treatment information
is perplexing, since the duty to disclose alternatives does not require that
the physician actually perform the alternative treatment option. Moreover,
the court's failure to recognize any disclosure duty is particularly
troubling, considering that the parents specifically and repeatedly asked
about alternatives to the recommended treatments prior to "choosing" the
recommended treatments that ultimately killed their young daughter -- and
were told there were none.
Both the Parris and Schiff decisions suggest that courts in
purportedly reasonable patient jurisdictions may in reality require nothing
more of physicians than the medical community standard would require -
compliance with a physician's duty of due care. Indeed, the Schiff court
makes it plain that it does not understand the distinction between the
physician's duty of due care and the physician's duty to disclose all
material information that a reasonable patient would find material to a
treatment decision at all:
With respect to alternative treatments, under the doctrine of
informed consent there is no general duty of disclosure with
respect to non-recommended procedures. Instead, the failure to
recommend a procedure must be addressed under ordinary
medical negligence standards. That is, a physician must disclose
alternative treatments only to the extent that it is required for
competent medical practice within the medical community. 118
By failing to recognize that the duty to disclose information that
would be material to a patient is an independent and more expansive duty
than the duty of due care, these reasonable patient courts ignore the
essential reasoning of both Cobb and Canterbury, both of which declared
that:
To bind the disclosure obligation to medical usage is to arrogate
the decision to the physician alone. Respect for a patient's right
of self-determination on a particular therapy demands a standard
116 Id. at 701, 703-05.
117 Id. at 706-07.
118 Id. at 701.
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set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians may
or may not impose upon themselves.ll 9
As the case law illustrates, courts thus far have been extremely
reluctant to require a physician to disclose material information regarding
alternative treatments residing outside of the medical community's
recognized treatments or even alternative schools of thought within the
same medical community, even in purportedly "reasonable patient"
jurisdictions. But how can such paternalistic deference be reconciled with
the stated purpose behind "informed consent" - i.e., to allow patients
greater autonomy and self-determination regarding their own physical and
mental health? And what if an entire medical community is wrong
regarding a course of treatment or slow to accept a beneficial treatment
that might decrease or eliminate unwanted side effects or better align with
a patient's own healthcare preferences? Under the current reality, it will be
the under-informed patients, and not the non-disclosing physicians, who
will suffer the ultimate consequences.
C. Why Disclosure of Unrecognized Alternatives is Critical in the
Experimental Mental Health Context
Although a failure to disclose information regarding unrecognized
but available alternative treatment options in any context robs a patient of
true autonomy and self-determination, there are additional reasons why
disclosure of available alternative treatment options to psychotropic
medication is particularly urgent.
First, as earlier described, unlike many proven successful medical
treatments, -compelling evidence now suggests that psychotropic
medication is not only of limited effectiveness, could do more harm to the
mental health patient than good. 12 0 Consequently, for a prescribing
physician to recommend psychotropic medication without being required
to disclose existing safer alternatives is an extremely troubling aspect of
current single modality mental health care treatment.
1 21
Second, unless a mental health patient is a serious threat of harm to
either himself or others, the use of psychotropic medication can always be
119 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784 ("both the patient's right to know and the physician's correlative
obligation to tell him are diluted to the extent that its compass is dictated by the medical profession.").
120 See generally JACKSON, supra note 1.
121 See Matthies, 733 A.2d at 463 (N.J. 1999) (physicians have duty to disclose both less hazardous and
more hazardous alternatives to the recommended treatment and "may neither impose their values on their
patients or substitute their level of risk aversion for that of the patients... [b]y not telling the patient of all
medically reasonable alternatives, the physician breaches the patient's right to make an informed choice.").
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selected later, in the event that the non-medication alternatives prove
unsatisfactory to the patient or the patient's legal surrogate. This is unlike
a traditional medical treatment situation involving a life-threatening illness
or one requiring immediate surgical attention.
122
Third, the scientific literature suggesting viable alternative treatment
options to psychotropic medication is abundant, and should be given no
less consideration than the literature suggesting the effectiveness of
psychotropic medication. 123 Indeed, while some pro-medication advocates
may argue that the studies for alternatives, such as diet-based alternatives,
do not satisfy the rigorous standards for evidence-based medicine, the
same arguments, and more, have been advanced with respect to studies on
the safety and effectiveness of psychotropic medications.
24
Fourth, evidence overwhelmingly reveals that patients and legal
surrogates want to know about safer alternatives to psychotropic
medications, and have often queried their physicians about the availability
of such alternatives. The reported failures of the mainstream prescribing
physician communities to respond to patient-initiated queries on
alternative treatments is another troubling aspect of current mental health
care treatment.
Finally, negligence-based informed consent laws present a uniquely
difficult burden for mental health patients who are put on psychotropic
medication without being informed of available safer alternatives. That is,
due to the still unknown extent of the harm caused by psychotropic
medications and the nature of mental illness itself, in many instances, any
"harm" caused by the medications may go undetected for years, or may be
attributed to the alleged progression of the mental illness itself.t
25
Accordingly, mental health plaintiffs will often be at a unique
122 See Parris, 21 Cal. App. 4th at 193 (Of course, the Parris court's dicta notes that in cases of cancer or
other potentially life-threatening procedures, a physician may have a duty to inform the patient of
unrecognized alternatives).
123 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 1, at 300-01 (noting numerous studies that have shown that non-
pharmacological treatments for various mental health disorders often significantly outperform
pharmacological treatments).
124 See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 17-40 (noting glaring problems with various RCT's for psychotropic
medications, including selection bias, non-equivalent dosing, concomitant medications used to compensate
for side-effects of the study drug, omission of negative effects data, biased assessments, industry
sponsorship of the studies, and publication bias or suppression of any negative results); see also Michael
Weir, Legal Issues for Medical Doctors in the Provision of Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 26
MED. & LAW 817, 820 (2007) ("Even in the modem context there is no clear consensus on the extent to
which [orthodox medicine] is based upon solid scientific evidence. At the extreme edge of opinion one
source states that because of the poor quality of scientific research that only about 15% of medical
interventions are supported by solid scientific evidence.").
125 See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 235 (discussing the tendency to "blame the victim" by attributing any
harm to the progression of the illness itself and not to any effects of the medications).
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disadvantage when compared to traditional medical plaintiffs in trying to
establish the elements of both causation and harm. Because such
negligence-based laws would therefore almost always fail to provide an
adequate remedy for such patients, even assuming they could establish a
breach of a duty to inform them of the available alternatives, they should
be supplemented or replaced by a dignitary-based cause of action, where
patients are provided with a remedy for being deprived of their
informational rights alone. 126
There is, of course, a pragmatic reason why prescribing physicians
should be routinely disclosing alternatives to psychotropic medication: to
restore credibility to a now suspect profession and industry.127 Specifically,
as increasing numbers of children and adults are diagnosed or labeled with
newly created mental health disorders, and as evidence continues to
emerge of the often symbiotic relationship between the pharmaceutical
industry and the relevant prescribing physician/psychiatric communities,
more and more patients are likely to turn away from the mainstream
mental health care system. 128 A renewed, legally enforced commitment to
one's ethical obligations to disclose all risks, benefits, and viable
alternatives, including safer drug-free alternatives, may convince mental
health patients and/or their surrogates that their physicians are following
their Hippocratic Oaths to keep patients from harm. 1
29
126 A dignitary or informational-based model would recognize- that depriving a patient of information
alone.does indeed Yestt in an actual loss: the loss of individual autonomy and the right to determine what
should be done to one's own body. See Morris, supra note 13, at 330 (noting that a patient deprived of
information alone does have a complaint: the patient has been deprived of the right to decide); Kristen Ann
Curran, Informed Consent: A Right Without A Remedy Examined Through The Lens of Maternity Care, 21
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 133, 158 (2012)("informational standing is a possible mechanism to
remedying violations of informed consent that do not result in any injury other than the denial of
information and, consequently, infringe upon the private right of bodily integrity.").
127 See, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 1, at 16 ("it would be difficult to overstate the ethical crisis which has
emerged in the field of psychiatry, due to conflicts of interest, and the intentional manipulation of
[psychotropic medication] trial designs."); WHITTAKER, supra note 47, at 54-66 (noting the "unholy
alliance" between the pharmaceutical industry and the psychiatric and medical communities).
128 See, e.g., Fay Karpouzis & Rod Bonello, Nutritional Complementary and Alternative Medicine for
Pediatric Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, 14 ETHICAL HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY & PSYCHIATRY 41,
41 (2012) ("Increasing prevalence rates of pediatric and adolescent attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder,
concerns over safety and efficacy of psychostimulants, and fears about long-term use of psychostimulants
have lead many parents to seek alternative therapies for their children.").
129 For the original, as well as a modem, version of the Hippocratic Oath see Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic
Oath Today, PBS.ORG (May 27, 2001), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html
(Interestingly, the original version provides the following: "I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of
the sick according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them from harm and injustice. I will neither give
a deadly drug to anybody who asked for it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect.").
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V. A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO ENSURE DISCLOSURE OF
SAFER ALTERNATIVES
While the relevant mainstream physician communities involved in
prescribing psychotropic medications may eventually acknowledge the
available scientific literature supporting alternative treatment options to
psychotropic medication, these prescribing physician communities have an
ethical obligation to disclose this alternative treatment information now.
Yet, with studies showing continued physician resistance to their
disclosure obligations, the parameters of these disclosure obligations must
be set and enforced by law.
Unfortunately, it is clear that courts have failed patients seeking
redress for physician nondisclosure of unrecognized but available
alternative treatment options thus far. Moreover, in the mental health
context, general informed consent laws will never ensure physician
disclosure because they often fail to provide a remedy to patients entirely.
Accordingly, legislatures should adopt dignitary-based informed consent
provisions that would better ensure adequate disclosure of alternative
treatment options and provide a mental health patient with an actual cause
of action in the event that a physician fails to disclose the material
information regarding these alternatives to psychotropic medications.
Admittedly, there must be a balance between a patient's reasonable
informational needs and a physician's liability concerns. As case law
already recognizes, physicians should not have to provide a "disquisition"
or a "short medical education" or disclose information that is already
common knowledge. 30 Nor should physicians be required to disclose any
illegal or unsafe alternative treatment options that lack data-driven
evidence supporting their safety and effectiveness. At the same time,
however, physicians should not fail to disclose alternative treatments
options simply because they lie outside of their own medical community's
practice area or because they do not like or offer the alternative treatments
themselves.
131
While there is no obvious "tipping point" for mandatory disclosure of
an alternative treatment option, a number of scholars and practitioners
addressing physician disclosure of Complementary and Alternative (CAM)
therapies have offered a number of useful factors that could be easily
130 See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782 n.27.
131 See Lakhan supra note 52, at 5; see also Pauline W. Chen, Teaching Doctors About Nutrition and Diet,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/health/16chen.html?_r=0
(noting that "you can't just keep writing out script after script after script of new medications when diet is
just as important as drugs or any other treatment a patient may be using.").
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utilized in any statutory scheme to regulate the disclosure of alternatives to
psychotropic medication.
13 2
A. Risk-Benefit Assessment
First, in order to exercise the right of self-determination effectively,
patients must be able to compare reasonable treatment alternatives and the
risks attendant to each. For example, a reasonable alternative to a
recommended treatment or procedure may improve the patient's condition
less, but virtually eliminate serious risks, which may be of more concern to
that particular patient.133 If the physician fails to disclose the less effective,
but safer alternative to the patient, then the patient cannot perform the
individualized risk assessment inherent in the very purpose behind
meaningful "informed consent., 134 Thus, for all of the reasons this article
discusses, in the case of a choice between a pharmacological treatment
versus an alternative non-pharmacological treatment, prescribing
physicians should always be required to also disclose to patients any
available safer non-pharmacological treatments in addition to the
recommended treatment with psychotropic medication. 135 This should be
particularly the case where the patient is not a serious risk to himself or
others and can always later choose the riskier alternative of medication, if
the non-pharmacological alternative treatment recommendation proves
ineffective or unsatisfactory to the patient.'36
B. Clinical Trials and Published Literature
Second, physicians should be required to disclose alternative
treatment options where there is published scientific literature supporting
the viability of such alternative treatment options. 137 While not often
readily acknowledged by mainstream medicine, there is an abundance of
scientific studies and published literature establishing the efficacy and
effectiveness of many alternative treatments to traditional recommended
treatments. For example, the Cochrane Collaboration, an international
132 See generally Michael Weir, Obligation to Advise of Options for Treatment: Medical Doctors and
Complementary and Alternative Medicine Practitioners, 10 JOURNAL OF LAW & MED. 296 (2003);
Gilmour, supra note 21, at 190; Bulen, supra note 20, at 354.
133 Bulen, supra note 20, at 341.
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., P. Hill & E. Taylor, An Auditable Protocol for Treating Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder, 84 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 404, 405 (2001) (see for an example of how this might
work in practice: incorporating diet-based treatments prior to resorting to medication).
136 See Matthies, 733 A.2d at 463.
137 Bulen, supra note 20, at 354-55.
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network developed to collect, review, and promote evidence-based
research about many medical and mental health treatments, lists more than
4,000 RCT's related to Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM)
treatments in its database, with many of the RCT's revealing that various
CAM modalities may be viable effective alternative treatments for a
number of medical and mental health ailments.'38 Thus, in the case of the
disclosure of diet-based alternatives to stimulant medication, because
numerous RCT's and meta-analyses already provide evidentiary support
for alternatives to psychotropic medication, prescribing physicians should
also be required to disclose this option to patients when recommending
psychotropic medication.
Although some prescribing physicians might argue that they can't be
expected to know about all the published scientific literature on relevant
CAM modalities or all treatment alternatives beyond his or her mainstream
medical or mental health training, a number of CAM scholars and at least
one court disagree. 139 Instead, like any professional in a particular practice
area, physicians in the vast informational age of today should be expected,
at the very least, to be up-to-date and familiar with the scientific literature
regarding treatments outside of their range of medical expertise when
those alternative treatments are relevant to the very disorders the
physicians are being relied upon, and remunerated, to treat. As the
Canterbury court noted:
The patient's reliance upon a physician is a trust of the kind
which traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those
associated with arms-length transactions. His dependence on the
physician for information affecting his well-being, in terms of
contemplated treatment, is well-nigh abject. 140
Thus, where published scientific literature is available on alternative
treatment options for a particular disorder, it seems inherently reasonable
to expect a prescribing physician treating patients who presumably have
that disorder to know about the evidence suggesting that alternative
138 Id.; see About Us, THE COCHRANE COLLABORATION, http://www.cochrane.org/about-us (last accessed
Sept. 15, 2013).
139 See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding doctors liable for
failing to respond to plaintiffs' inquiries about risks of anticonvulsant medication on unborn children, and
particularly finding that: "a literature search would have revealed several articles regarding the correlation
of Dilantin and birth defects, including a 'hallmark' article.. published in The Lancet"); see also Weir,
supra note 132, at 301 ("In essence, we could ask ourselves whether a reasonable doctor practicing
medicine in the 21" century, in light of increasing knowledge regarding patient behavior and alternative
medicines, should be aware of, and advise patients of, the presence of alternative approaches.").
140 Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 782.
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treatments are available, and to convey that information to their patients
when making treatment recommendations. 141
C. Supplementing Patient Queries
Third, although patients should not be expected to ask for
information before receiving it, where patients or their legal surrogates
have specifically queried about alternative treatment options, physicians
should be required to provide patients with this information, even if the
physician himself does not agree that such alternatives are effective. 142 At
the very least, a query certainly alerts the physician to an individual
patient's particular medical or mental health needs and concerns. 143 As
many scholars and medical practitioners have already acknowledged,
patients today have greater access to information about their medical and
mental health care options than ever before. Because of the widespread
availability of information about complementary and alternative
treatments, as well as information about the high risks of psychotropic
medications, many mental health patients and/or their legal surrogates
have already expressed a preference for non-invasive and non-
pharmacological treatment options. While physicians may not necessarily
agree with the preference for such non-invasive alternative treatment
options, they "may neither impose their values on their patients or
substitute their level of risk aversion for that of their patients."' 44 Instead,
the physician, as the person in the position of greater medical knowledge,
must simply communicate all known risks and benefits of the alternative
treatment options, helping the patient to sort through any complicated
areas of uncertainty, and allowing the patient to make the ultimate decision
regarding his or her own mental health care. Only if this dialogue and
exchange of all material information occurs can a mental health patient or
their surrogate truly consent to a recommended course of treatment
involving psychotropic medication.
141 See, e.g., Weir, supra note 132, at 301; see also Bulen, supra note 20, at 355 (noting that "Because
these RCT's suggest that some CAM treatments may be safe and effective, a reasonable patient could
conclude that their availability is material to decisions to undergo medical treatment. Moreover, upon
comparison of the risks and benefits of CAM versus conventional treatments, a reasonable patient could
elect CAM. If physicians are to respect patient autonomy and give the patient-oriented standard its full
meaning, then they must disclose reasonable, safe, and effective CAM.").
142 But see Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 783 n.36 ("We discard the thought that the patient should ask for
information before the physician is required to disclose. Caveat emptor is not the norm for the consumer of
medical services. Duty to disclose is more than a call to speak merely on the patient's request; it is a duty to
volunteer, if necessary, the information the patient needs for intelligent decision.").
143 See Matthies, 733 A.2d at 463 ("A physician may select a method of treatment that is medically
reasonable, but not the one the patient would have selected if informed of alternative methods.").
144 Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In the experimental context of mental health treatment, failing to
disclose the availability of safer, non-invasive alternatives to psychotropic
medication can prove tragic to the mental health patient, who may never
recover from the harms caused by the medication. When evidence suggests
that alternatives are not only available but may also be more effective in
the long run, physicians, courts, and legislatures have the collective
obligation to ensure that mental health patients and their legal surrogates
are provided with this material alternative treatment information. Indeed,
patients who are not provided with this material information regarding
available alternatives by their treating physicians are not giving true
informed consent to treatment with psychotropic medication.
Unfortunately, without better informed consent laws that ensure
physician disclosure of nontraditional alternative treatment options and an
actual dignitary-based remedy for patients who are deprived of this
material information, mental health patients will continue to be funneled to
dangerous, and perhaps wholly unnecessary, mind-altering medication.
Legislatures should instead enact dignitary-based informed consent
provisions that specifically address the need to disclose all available
alternatives to psychotropic medications and provide a cause of action to
plaintiffs for the informational breach alone. By enumerating specific
factors to help guide both physicians and courts in determining whether
disclosure of an existing alternative treatment option is or was warranted,
legislatures can strike a balance between ensuring that physicians will be
protected against unlimited liability for failing to disclose unsafe,
unsubstantiated, or illegal treatments, and ensuring that patients will
receive all of the material information they need in order to participate
meaningfully in their own mental health treatment decisions.
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